In this article I seek to establish what, if anything, might be morally troubling about morally enhancing oneself through biomedical means. Building on arguments by Harris, while simultaneously acknowledging several valid counter-arguments that have been put forth by his critics, I
| INTRODUCTION
Most of us try, in various ways and to varying degrees of success, to be better people. Over time we have developed a range of tools and techniques of varying efficacy to aid us in these efforts -we might seek the advice of others, make resolutions, read instructive works of fiction and non-fiction, and so on. In recent years, however, bioethicists have become increasingly interested in the idea that one day we might be able to 'morally enhance' ourselves through biomedical means. The actual development and manufacture of such 'biomedical moral enhancements' (hereafter BMEs) still looks some way off. Sceptics are, perhaps, more numerous. To being with, there are those who doubt whether such technologies are really feasible. We might wonder, for example, whether we could ever reach a consensus as to what changes such technologies ought to bring about. 5 It is also unclear whether, even if they were feasible, they would be particularly helpful. For example, far from enabling us to act morally, it seems possible that some BMEs may be detrimental in certain situations. wrought by BMEs (as they are typically imagined) really constitute 'moral' enhancements in the way their proponents suggest; that is, whether they actually make us 'better people' in the way a moral enhancement should. 7 Assuming, though, that we can find satisfactory responses to these kinds of issues, we might still ask whether actually taking a BME would incur any kind of moral cost, either to the agent or to someone else.
One set of worries writers have had here is how the use of BMEs might change the social and political landscape. Sparrow, for example, objects to BMEs partly on the grounds that they would probably grant the morally enhanced important advantages over the non-enhanced. 8 Similarly, Brooks claims that moral enhancement might benefit some moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines over others, undermining the existence of a 'reasonable pluralism in modern liberal societies '. 9 Yet, insofar as these concerns relate to costs BMEs might incur, we might still ask whether there are any moral costs necessarily incurred by using BMEs, that would be incurred in all possible worlds.
One line of criticism that appears to meet this criteria is put forward by those who object to BMEs, not on the grounds that they are biomedical interventions designed to enhance ourselves morally but rather on the grounds that they are biomedical interventions designed for the purposes of enhancement, the entire project of biomedical enhancement already being morally dubious for a variety of reasons -for example, because it is 'unnatural', or because it perpetuates the (false) idea that we ought to strive toward perfection. 10 However, again, one shortcoming of this line of criticism is that it does not pick out any problem with BMEs in particular, which is to say, a cost incurred by virtue of the fact that they are biomedical enhancements directed towards making us better people, as opposed to any other kind of biomedical enhancement. Specifying our question further, then, we might now ask whether there are any moral costs necessarily incurred by using BMEs, that would be incurred in all possible worlds, and that are not derived simply by virtue of the fact that they are one method by which we might enhance ourselves biomedically?
In this essay, I argue that there is one such cost, namely the limitations BMEs impose on our freedom. This line of criticism is far from novel, having already been voiced by a range of authors, most notably, that, at the point at which they are taken, all BMEs necessarily incur at least some moral cost.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I outline the kind of BMEs I will be discussing in the analysis to follow, which is to say, those BMEs by which we might attempt to make ourselves agents with morally better motives. In this section, I also explain a little bit about how such enhancements are imagined to work. In Section 3, I consider how BMEs might affect our freedom, while in Section 4 I turn to the ethical significance of these effects. In Section 5, I consider a few counter-arguments to my position as well as its implications for the debate around BMEs generally. I conclude in Section 6. Harris, J. (2011) . Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics, 25, 102-111; Harris, J. (2013) . Ethics is for bad guys! Putting the 'moral' into moral enhancement. Bioethics, 27, [169] [170] [171] [172] [173] agents with morally better motives. Since this is the kind of BME which is discussed most often by proponents of such technologies, one benefit of centring our discussion on these interventions in particular is that it helps ensure we are at least meeting any possible opponents on their own ground.
| B I O M E D I C A L MOR A L EN H A N C E M E N T S
One kind of BME we might be thinking of here, then, would be Douglas's example of a BME capable of attenuating our 'counter-moral' emotions:
Example A: James is a district court judge in a multi-ethnic area. He was brought up in a racist environment and is aware that emotional responses introduced during his childhood still have a biasing influence on his moral and legal thinking. For example, they make him more inclined to counsel jurors in a way that suggests a guilty verdict, or to recommend harsher sentencing, when the defendant is African-American. A drug is available that would help to mitigate this bias.
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Persson and Savulescu discuss similar kinds of technologies, reflecting on the possibility of administering oxytocin for its 'pro-social effects' and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) on the grounds that there is some evidence that they make subjects more 'fair-minded and willing to cooperate' with others. within him a general feeling of fraternity and common humanity, or by strengthening a general feeling of fraternity and common humanity that he already has so that it has a greater (though not decisive) bearing on his decision-making. In what follows I shall refer to this as biomedical moral enhancement through augmentation.
To sum up, then, the kind of biomedical moral enhancements I want to assess here are those biomedical interventions (actual or possible) by which we might try to a) prevent certain states or processes from arising; b) prevent those states or processes that do arise from influencing our moral thinking; c) create certain states or processes within our mind that might not otherwise exist; or d) supplement those states or processes that do arise so that they are more prominent than they might otherwise be; all with the overall aim of making ourselves morally better people in the sense of being agents with morally better dispositions.
| BMEs ' EFFECT ON OUR F REEDOM
If this is what we mean when we talk about BMEs, is there anything we might find morally troubling about using such technologies? As inti- In this, I tend to follow William's (1965) lead: 'Some of what I have to say may seem too psychological. In one respect, I make no apology for this. . .in as much as I think that a neglect of moral psychology and in particular of the role of emotion in morality has distorted and made unrealistic a good deal of recent discussion; having disposed of emotivism as a theory of the moral judgment, philosophers have perhaps tended to put the emotions on one side as at most contingent, and therefore philosophically uninteresting, concomitants to other things which are regarded as alone essential. This must surely be wrong: to me, at least, the question of what emotions a man feels in various circumstances seems to have a good deal to do, for instance, with whether he is an admirable human being or not. ' (Williams, B. A. O. (1965 Elsewhere, DeGrazia has argued that, contra-Harris, there is no reason to suppose that the moral behaviour of those who have undergone biomedical moral enhancement would necessarily or routinely fail the necessary conditions of free, or what he terms 'autonomous', action: namely i) that A does X because she prefers to do X; ii) that A has this preference because she (at least dispositionally) identifies with and prefers to have it; and (iii) that this identification has not resulted primarily from influences that A would, on careful reflection, consider alienating.
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Both of these responses have their merits. First, following DeGrazia, insofar as we take Harris to be claiming that any action taken partly or wholly as the result of a BME cannot be considered intentional or reflective of the 'considered moral values of the individuals making them', it seems clear that that claim is false. Rather, if we assume P took their BME voluntarily and in full knowledge of its effects on their subsequent action, then it looks as if we would say, of any of P's actions that were the result of their having taken the BME, that they reflect P's considered values, simply by virtue of the fact that they reflect the kind of actions P intended to bring about by taking the BME, when they took the BME they did. Of course, there may be certain cases in which agents change their 'considered values' between the time they took the BME and the time its effects are felt. In these kinds of cases, any subsequent action they took as a result of their having taken the BME would seem to fail to reflect their considered values. In turn, this would raise questions about alienation. 22 However, in those cases in which agents do not undergo such changes -in cases where their preferences and considered values remain stable (i.e.
DeGrazia's second condition of autonomous action) -it seems difficult to motivate the same concerns. Thus, while the spectre of alienation looks like a valid concern with respect to some BMEs in some circumstances, it does not look like a moral cost that BMEs would necessarily incur in all possible worlds.
Following Douglas, and seemingly contra-Harris (or, at least, a quick reading of Harris), it looks as if there may also be cases in which BMEs grant us freedoms previously unavailable to us. To a certain extent, the precise way Douglas puts this -that is, in terms of 'increases' or 'decreases' to one's general freedom -can get us into thorny territory with regards to how specific freedoms (P's freedom to do x) relate to one's overall freedom (P's freedom tout court). 23 For example, although it is not a position with which I agree, some writers would deny that it makes any sense whatsoever to talk of freedom as a quantitative attribute, that there is any such thing as freedom tout court but rather only specific freedoms. 24 As S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters put it, 'liberty is not a commodity to be weighed and measured. I am free to do x, y, and z, but not to do p, q, and r -but there is no substance called "freedom" of which I can therefore possess more or less'. 25 However, if we take Douglas's point here to be the more modest suggestion that, in mitigating against those dispositional states that would otherwise hinder one's ability to act in a way reflective of one's considered values, BMEs might confer upon us certain specific freedoms which were otherwise barred, then it would be difficult to conclude that the only influence any BME can have on our freedom is in removing freedoms which we would have otherwise enjoyed (one reading, perhaps, of Harris's position).
Finally, if we take Harris's claim that biomedical moral enhancements make 'the freedom to do immoral things impossible' as a claim to the effect that the kind of BMEs championed by Douglas and others necessarily preclude one from being able to behave immorally, then that claim also looks highly debatable. 26 The problem here is that this A further objection to Harris's argument which I do not consider here is raised by Savulescu and Persson, who claim that individuals' freedom could never be threatened by BMEs, assuming that they augment individuals' moral dispositions (Persson & Savulescu, Getting moral enhancement right, op. cit. note 4). However, as Bublitz points out, the salient point here is not what dispositions BMEs create but rather how they create them. As Bublitz explains, 'S&P too easily pass over a very influential variation of compatibilism which denies responsibility if persons act on preferences that were brought about through manipulation. . .[the central idea of this position] is that autonomy is a historical phenomenon, which means that apart from sufficient capacities in the moment of action, the genesis of preferences leading to action is relevant. . .What matters is how they acquired their preferences and became the persons they are'. (C. Bublitz, C. (2016 To a certain extent, DeGrazia can be a little slippery on this point. For example, after having stressed that the 'ability to act otherwise, or freedom to fall, is not a necessary condition of free action', DeGrazia goes on to claim that 'Nevertheless, some conceivable forms of MB would pose a threat to freedom. Imagine a computer chip that could be implanted in someone's brain such that whenever the agent decided to perform a certain kind of immoral action, he would change his mind. The implant would reliably, automatically redirect his decision-making. It seems plausible to assert that this sort of MB would make an agent unfree with respect to certain actions (even if the agent welcomed the MB), and possibly in motivationbased ways-say, if it made the agent suddenly lose the desire to perform the action in question. But most of the types of MB under consideration, including the examples enumerated earlier, do not have this apparently freedom-robbing quality.' (DeGrazia, op. cit. note 21) In this way, then, DeGrazia seems to acknowledge that our freedom can be 'threatened' insofar as the ability to act otherwise is restricted and that one's freedom to do what one prefers is not a sufficient condition of freedom (the agent having 'welcomed' the BME). As a further aside, it should also be noted that one of the points made in the analysis to follow is that far from being a relatively rare phenomenon with regards to BMEs, this 'freedom-robbing quality' is, in fact, a necessary feature of all BMEs. (or specific freedoms), rather than taking them as relevant to the question of whether or not a given agent is free (see Section Three below).
Assuming this conception of freedom, then, what more might be said for Harris's line of criticism against BMEs? One thing that I believe has been lost in this debate, particularly in all the talk about BMEs effect on our overall freedom, is that even if Douglas is right to think that BMEs may act as a net contribution to our overall freedom, or at least grant us specific freedoms from which we would otherwise be barred, simply by virtue of the fact that they determine one's future dispositions to follow a particular course (whether in augmenting dispositions or mitigating them), BMEs necessarily take away at least some specific freedoms which we would have otherwise have enjoyed.
For example, say that P takes an augmentative BME at T1 in order to create disposition x at T2. In this case, regardless of whether or not having disposition x at T2 increases or decreases P's overall freedom, (or grants her specific freedoms she would have otherwise foregone), by taking the augmentative BME, P necessarily determines herself to have the disposition that intervention brings about at the time its effects are felt. Thus, by taking the BME, P effectively removes two possible courses of action previously open to her: (i) the possibility of not having x at T2, and (ii) the possibility of having x at T2 as the result of some other means (say a decision) taken between T1 and T2.
35 Similarly, if P were to take a mitigatory BME at T1, designed to prevent x from arising within her at T2, she would effectively be removing two possible courses of action previously open to her: namely, the possibility of having x at T2 and the possibility of not having x at T2 as the result of some other means taken between T1 and T2.
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Now it may be that, in some further subset of the possible worlds in which P takes the BME, P has resources at her disposal that allow her to interrupt this causal pathway. Perhaps the BMEs effects are reversible and she has both access to an antidote and time to use it between T1 and T2. However, the important point here is that, irrespective of whether or not P has the resources to forestall this restriction to her freedom, simply by virtue of the way the BME works, at the point at which P takes the BME, (T1), this restriction has necessarily been imposed and would be imposed in all possible worlds. Where, then, it is not possible for P to forestall this restriction -say, because the BMEs effects are irreversible, or she does not access to the relevant antidote -that restriction would be permanent. However, even where it is possible for P to remedy such a restriction, any such remedy will still require some further action either by her, or that of another party. From this, then, we might recognize that there is a deterministic element about BMEs, one which may be more or less irrevocable depending on the case in hand, yet one that is also undoubtedly deterministic and which is engendered in all possible worlds. Given the concessions we have made to Harris's opponents, though, it looks as if this particular argument is now going to face a number of problems. First, while we might recognize that all BMEs 'bypass cognition' in the way they work, following Douglas's counter, we might also think that some BMEs -most notably BMEs that work through mitigation -may actually allow us to cognize better than we would have otherwise been able. Far from undermining moral responsibility, then, it could be that we are more responsible for actions we take while in a biomedically 'enhanced' state (say, one free of dispositions we recognize as disruptive) than those we undertake absent such 35 One assumption here, of course, is that insofar as one takes a BME at T1 to have disposition x at T2, that causal path cannot be superseded by some further decision one takes between T1 and T2 to also have disposition x at T2. In other words, then, the causal path created by the BME cannot be 'trumped' by a subsequent decision. Admittedly, there may be those who question this view but it seems to me to be a reasonable one. Certainly, it seems difficult to understand how subsequent decisions could 'override' the kind of physical process begun by a BME, or indeed what 'overriding' such processes would mean in this context.
At this point, one might object that all BMEs may not have this effect in all possible worlds, for it may be that the possibility of having x at T2, and the possibility of not having x at T2 as the result of some other means taken between T1 and T2 was never open to P to begin with, as such the BME has imposed no loss on her freedom. However, I take that the discussion about the ethical acceptability of BMEs looks to those possible worlds in which it actually has an effect, which is to say, those in which it is not redundant. Therefore, I take these possibilities to be irrelevant to the present analysis.
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Bublitz makes an analogous point here about the 'freedom of the mind' (Bublitz, op. cit. note 28). In the end, my thesis does not entirely agree with Bublitz's -for example, I am not entirely convinced that freedom of the mind (in the sense I mean it) requires conscious control over one's mind (as it does for Bublitz). Moreover, in this article I try to motivate the moral cost to BMEs in a slightly different way to Bublitz. However, this being said, there are clearly many points of agreement between his thesis and my own and hence they may be seen as offering broadly comparable critiques of BMEs.
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Harris, Ethics is for bad guys!, op. cit. note 11.
39
Harris, Moral enhancement and freedom, op. cit. note 11. 40 Harris, Ethics is for bad guys!, op. cit. note 11. 41 Harris, Moral enhancement and freedom, op. cit. note 11.
treatments (on the assumption that the latter set of actions are less likely to reflect our considered views on a given matter).
Second, even when we restrict Harris's criticism simply to those BMEs that work through augmentation, insofar as we assume that a) the BME was taken voluntarily, b) our dispositional state is not the only determinant of our behaviour -both of which look reasonable -it looks difficult to motivate the view that we are not responsible for any action we make while being in a biomedically 'enhanced' state, for in such a case, we would still be responsible for both having taken the BME and acting on the basis of the dispositional state caused by the BME.
Thus, while it seems clear that Harris is right to think that BMEs impose certain restrictions on our freedom, when we clarify exactly what kind of restrictions these technologies are imposing, it does not look like the type of restriction that would necessarily undercut moral responsibility (or at least, the kind of moral responsibility we usually care about). However, all this being said, I think there is still good reason to think the deterministic elements of BMEs are morally troubling:
namely, by virtue of the freedoms they subtract.
There are two ways that this thought might go. First, one might hold that the limitations BMEs impose on our freedoms come at a certain moral cost because those freedoms the BMEs remove have a certain value, and the reason they have that value is specifically by virtue of what they allow us to do. For example, on Kymlicka's conception of freedom's value, specific freedoms are valuable to the extent that they serve some set of interests. As he puts it, 'the reason it is important to be free in a particular respect is not the amount of freedom it provides, but rather the importance of the various interests it serves'. 42 One reason we may find BMEs troubling, then, is that we value our ability to affect our dispositional state (either in having or not having certain dispositions) and that therefore we attach a certain value to our specific freedom to change our dispositions as we see fit.
As well as such freedoms having value in this respect, however, Carter gives us good reason to believe that they might also have what he calls non-specific value, which is to say, that we might value freedoms 'independently of the value we attach to the specific things they leave us free to do'. 43 In defending this position, Carter draw our attention both to freedom's instrumental value (for example, as a means to individual well-being) and to the intrinsic value we place on our 'agency', which is to say, 'our ability to make an impact on the world, by intervening in the causal chains which bring about events and states of affairs'. 44 It is for these kinds of reasons, then, that irrespective of what our choices get us we still tend to value having more choice rather than less. attach to having morally troubling dispositions or not having morally virtuous dispositions, but rather the value we attach to our ability to affect our dispositional state -one such capacity being our ability to resist having dispositions we recognize as morally troubling and another being our ability to have dispositions we recognize as morally virtuous. Yet even if we were to be persuaded that that ability was of no real value -and hence, by Kymlicka's lights, our freedom to exercise such an ability could be of no real value -given freedom itself has a non-specific value, we might still say that there is a moral cost to the freedoms BMEs preclude, 'independently of the value we attach to the specific things they leave us free to do'.
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Of course, there may be those who are still sceptical about whether the freedoms BMEs remove have the kind of value I have suggested they do. However, whatever kind of value such freedoms do have, I think it is relatively clear that they do at least possess some value. One way we might see this, perhaps, is that we tend to balk at any situation in which we are forced to give them up. Consider, for example, the case of Ulysses and the Sirens. As legend would have it, in order to pass safely by the Island of the Sirens, Ulysses instructs his crew to tie him to the mast of the ship, so that he might hear the Sirens' song without being lured to his death. Ibid: p. 42. In his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick describes a thought experiment that appears to bring out the value of such 'doings' beautifully. Imagine, Nozick says, that there was an 'experience machine' that could give you any experience you desired, neuropsychologists being able to stimulate your brain in such a way that you would think and feel like you were writing a great novel, or making a friend. Would you use such a machine? Nozick surmises, fairly reasonably, that normally we would not. And, as he explains, the reason for this is that we do not merely value experiencing things but actually doing them (Nozick, R. 1974 Savulescu that Ulysses's actions were overall justified, it also seems plain enough that they are not actions we would normally want to undertake. That is, we would not normally consider it a 'good thing' to be tied to a mast. Rather, it seems clear enough that one of the few reasons that we would accept such a restriction is if it were necessary, that is, if we knew that without such restraints we would commit acts in direct conflict with our deepest commitments.
Regardless, then, of whether Ulysses actions may be overall justified given his predicament, we can still recognize that they come at a moral cost, that tying oneself to a mast is not a good or even morally neutral way to live one's life. And it is this cost, it seems, which is necessarily incurred by morally enhancing oneself biomedically.
| O B J EC T I O NS AN D RE P LI E S
How might a proponent of BMEs respond to the arguments made in this article? One move they may make here is to claim that, in their deterministic or freedom-robbing effects, there is little difference between BMEs and a number of other, more 'traditional' means by which we might morally enhance ourselves. 47 Take, for example, a monk who, after years of 'aversion therapy', repeating mantras and so on, has 'conditioned' themselves such that they are unable to feel the lure of earthly pleasures. Like someone taking a BME, then, in this case it looks as if the monk, at T1, has taken a course of action that will ensure (subject to no further intervention), they will not experience a given disposition at T2. Are we really ready to tar these strategies with the same brush we applied to BMEs?
One response to this might be to question whether the two cases are really alike. One disanalogy we might note between the monk's process of conditioning and BMEs, for example, is the effectiveness of the intervention, that is, the extent to which it actually succeeds in changing an individual's dispositional state. This point is significant because, of course, all the costs the present analysis attaches to BMEs are premised on the assumption that they actually work, which is to say, that they actually do bring about the effects they are designed to bring about. If, then, we were to assume that, as it happens, the kinds of techniques used by the monk are far less effective in actually changing their dispositional state than, say, a BME would be, then we might similarly adjust their potential moral cost.
However, let us assume for the sake of argument that the technique does work, or works at least as well as a BME. Would the process bear the same moral costs? On this point I find myself fairly willing to bite the bullet. That is, it seems to me fairly intuitive that insofar as these kinds of strategies are also methods by which we might determine ourselves to be better people, they are also strategies that come at some moral cost: the freedoms they prevent us from enjoying.
This objection mirrors a similar one by Douglas, who asks whether we can reasonably differentiate mitigatory BMEs from other ways in which we might stop ourselves from feeling certain desires and dispositions. Douglas, Moral enhancement via direct emotion modulation, op. cit. note 3.
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I also take this bullet-biting to extend to cases where individuals are born unable not to feel certain conditions. For example, one objection writers have raised to accounts such as the present one is they can seem to run counter to our intuitions that those who are born with, say, a disproportionately high level of empathy, are just as free as anyone else. The thought being that if we do not consider people who are genetically predetermined to experience certain dispositions as 'less free' than we are, why should we think that BMEs restrict our freedom when their effects are essentially identical? (See, e.g., DeGrazia, op. cit. note 21; Persson & Savulescu, Unfit for the future, op. cit. note 4; and Rakic, V., (2014) Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias. Journal of Medical Ethics, 40, 246-250). However, as I see it, insofar as we do take such people to be 'as free' as those who have greater control over the dispositions they feel, such intuitions are mistaken. Rather, there is a definite sense in which they are 'less free' than others -even if they do not feel less free, or put any value on that lack of freedom -namely that they lack a specific freedom that others do not: that is, the freedom not to feel the particular disposition they are genetically predetermined to feel. looks like a reasonable counter. However, it is worth emphasizing here that making this argument in no way refutes any of the analysis offered thus far. That is, I am willing to accept that there may be possible benefits to taking BMEs, dependent or independent of the context in which they were taken, which, considered individually or collectively, might render their use overall justified. However, the question about BMEs, as I took it, was not whether there are any benefits to taking BMEs, nor whether we can imagine a set of background conditions against which taking BMEs might become desirable or even morally obligatory (here we might think, for example, of Persson and Savulescu's defence of BMEs on the basis that it will help us avert an impending apocalypse). 50 Rather the question was whether, whatever benefits we may come to associate with BMEs, there is any sense in which we might find them morally troubling, whether there are any costs they necessarily incur. And in this article I have argued that there is: namely, the restriction they impose on our freedom.
Of course, in one sense, conceding both that, in some cases, the costs imposed by certain BMEs might be forestalled, and that, regardless, the use of some BMEs may still be overall justified, can seem to rob the present analysis of much of its argumentative force. However, I
think this ignores how the present argument shifts the terms of the ethical debate around BMEs. First, insofar as the present analysis establishes at least one moral cost necessarily incurred by all BMEs, it follows that it is no longer enough for writers like Douglas to defend them solely on the grounds that we have no good reason for thinking that their use is ethically troubling, for we now have at least one good reason to think that it is. Second, insofar as the argument set out in this article establishes a moral cost BMEs necessarily incur, we might also think that, if their use is nevertheless to be deemed all-thingsconsidered justified, we need to know that their capacity to generate some set of countervailing benefits is, if not similarly inevitable, more than merely possible. In other words, it is no longer enough for writers to defend the ethical desirability of BMEs simply on the basis that they may help us avert some set of future challenges that may or may not come to pass (as one might read, perhaps unfairly, Persson and Savulescu's defence of BMEs). Rather, if we are to consider the use of BMEs as overall justified, we need to know that these challenges are real ones, that the use of BMEs will help us in responding to them and that such benefits will be enough to outweigh their moral costs. For irrespective of whether BMEs do end up yielding these kinds of benefits, we now know that they will come at least some moral cost. 
| CONCLUSION

